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SCIENCE AND REALITY
BY T. SWANN HARDING
SCIENTISTS themselves, and even those huck jjrivates who form
the rear of the scientific profession, are alternately praised or
blamed for being materialists. At best it is said they deal with stark
realit}-. they get down to basic things, and definitely make contact
with the fundamental, material stuffs composing the universe about
us. Many people, fretful because they feel somehow detached from
reality—often they are economists or sociologists—will congratulate
workers in })hysical and biological sciences because they truly know
reality.
That attitude is so often expressed that one begins to wonder
and wondering, it seems best to consult some of our greatest scien-
tists to discover how they felt about reality. What is the opinion of
such men as Einstein and Meisenberg on this matter? Then, re-
turning to the sturdy routine workers who perform the humdrum
icbs in research laboratories without which great discoveries could
never occur, what is the experience of lowlier laboratory workers?
What is real under the microscope? What is real out there in the
sky ?
Here is a scientific article on star counting. It is illustrated by
photographs. One series of photographs depicts the same patch of
sky as seen using telescopes of increasing power. The first picture
represents what can be seen with a lens that renders only stars of
the twelfth magnitude clearly visible. The second, third, and fourth
pictures show the enormously increasing number of stars that appear
to exist when stronger glasses bring stars of the fifteenth, eighteenth,
and twentieth magnitude to visibility.
The ancients saw the stars with the naked eye. In that way one
can count about six thousand of them and one then sees stars of
only the first to sixth magnitudes. Stars of the first magnitude are
a hundred million times brighter than those of the sixth magnitude.
It is practically impossible to count all the stars in the sky as seen
by our most powerful telescopes ; they run into hundreds of mil-
lions. Therefore, counts are made in restricted areas of the sky, and
these are assumed representative of the whole.
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All right then : What is the reality here—the few thousand stars
seen by the naked eye or the countless millions seen by the aided eye ?
Or is the true reality what might be seen through a glass of infinite
power that would bring in all the stars ? Or is it the actual conditions
there millions of light years out in space, conditions we can never
experience in the sense that we experience things that happen in the
same room or on the same earth with us ?
We may leave the sky and consider a razor blade. We marvel at
its smooth edge. It feels and it looks smooth. We examine it under
the microscope and it is rough and jagged. What is the reality
about it?
Here is some salt on the table. We use it to season food. We can
get all we want very cheaply and it means little to us, but we read
that salt is rare and difficult to obtain in certain parts of the world
and is there esteemed highly as a great delicacy. What is the reality
about this common salt?
A chemist takes it to his laboratory. By appropriate means he
breaks it down. He shows us a soft, bright metal that can be cut
with a penknife and which, when thrown on water, spontaneously
bursts into flames. He shows us a queer greenish gas which makes
us cough if we try to breathe it. He says the metal is sodium and the
gas chlorine and that the common table salt is really composed of
them.
Is it really, we ask? What trace of that soft explosive metal and
that green gas is there to be found in this white powder, common
table salt ? If sodium and chlorine exist in the salt it is obvious they
must reside there as their own proper selves, at least that is the only
way we could recognize them. The chemist says that common salt
(NaCl) equals sodium (Xa) plus chlorine (CI). What does he
mean by equals?
Turn to another problem, that of lead in food. Lead is a poison.
If quantities of it remain in fresh fruits and vegetables after they
have been sprayed to rid them of insects the foods may be toxic
to human beings. Yet certain small traces of lead are not toxic
;
poison experts are agreed that the body can throw these ofif without
damage. Also certain foods contain no lead—at least that is the
report in a certain year.
A year or two passes and it is now reported that practically every
food contains some minute trace of lead. None are exempt. What
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has happened? A new and more retined method of chemically de-
termining lead has been invented. Foods that appeared to contain
no lead when the old method was used can now be shown to contain
it by this new and very delicate method. What is reality then? Isn't
it a function of the current retinement of instruments and methods?
What else?
Laboratory experience is often disconcerting and humbling. Any
number of times I have thought I had really proved what had not
been proved at all. Any number of times I have truly "seen" cer-
tain experiments turn out as my preconceptions told me they should
turn out when improvement in methods or better instruments, or a
chance inexplicable test which changed my preconception, soon macie
me '"see" the reverse quite as plainly.
At one time I worked for some years upon what I sincerely sup-
posed to be one compound in the blood which proved later to be quite
another. What happened later was still more striking. The man
who originally discovered the second compound, and who had also
reported synthesizing, or building it up, from its simpler constituents,
was wrong about its constitution. In the end it was discovered that
three different biological chemists in three different countries had
been working for some years in the effort to make a nonexistent sub-
stance !
Certainly the reality that the scientists apprehend diff'ers from
that the ordinary run of us experience simply because he uses dif-
ferent methods and instruments, as well as a dift'erent background of
knowledge, in analyzing and examining the data of experience, ^^'hat
the scientist regards as real today depends upon the state of his
knowledge, the refinement of his instruments, and the perfection of
his methods. Change any of these factors and he will of necessity
announce a new reality tomorrow.
^Moreover the scientist, like other human beings, is animated
by certain desires. For instance he prefers a monistic to a dualistic
universe. He prefers a certain continuity in the phenomena of
nature. He does not like to countenance arbitrary breaks in natural
phenomena and often says nature makes no sudden leaps. He as-
sumes that objects in some way persist and maintain their identity,
though he can not prove this.
What is the identity of a glass of water ? The water depends for
its shape and contour upon the nature of the glass. But what is
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more, its molecules are assumed to be in a state of perpetual motion
at tremendous speeds. At the top certain molecules are continually
shot off into space and become water vapor. Hence the glass of
water does not persist as such from one second to the next though
the scientist has to assume that it does.
The scientist also expects to find a certain simplicity and economy
in the explanation of natural events, and he holds that the simplest
and most economical explanatoin is therefore the truest—a piece of
]nire metaphysics. He tried to build such systems as will predict
future consequences accurately and he requires some sort of "stuff"
—
atoms or what you will—with which to build. He holds to the theo
ries of the uniformity of nature, the existence of determinism in
nature, and the validity of inductive generalization.
Like the rest of us, the scientist feels that when his expectations
have been fulfilled he is on the right path, and there is comfort in
that. At one time the universe made up of hard little billard-ball
atoms seemed to fulfill these expectations, along with the fiction of
potential energy
—
precisely enough fictioned potential energy being
created to enable the system to preserve its total energy and thus
satisfy the so-called law of the conservation of energy. But those
things have passed away. They are no longer real.
Atoms were invented to explain certain things scientists observed
in their laboratories, but they eventually assumed a suppositious
reality and in some mysterious way seemed to become more real than
the facts they were invented to explain. The same holds for our
more modern electrons, protons, and other particles, as well as for
genes and cells in biology. These things are constructs, not realities,
yet leading scientists often appear to feel as if they were very real.
However, it is said that the scientist "verifies" his assumptions.
What does this consist in? The scientist determines whether the
consequences deduced from his hypothesis are or are not contra-
dicted by his observations of nature. If the hypothesis can not be
verified it is excluded ruthlessly, for science is interested not in truth
as a whole but only in technically verified truths.
The only facts that have standing in science as it is are those
that fit into its current pattern of truth. The hypotheses of science
are indeed verified by the facts observed, but it must be remembered
that the only facts considered valid to verify the hypothesis are those
not too obviously in conflict therewith. Hence scientific laws and
the facts of nature form a mutual verification society.
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L pon what do the judgments of science depend? Upon a mere
half dozen factors. There are first, judgments of perception such
as : The rabbit is white. Second, there is the behef in the existence
of an external world, fundamental but incapable of proof. Third,
there is the belief in the trustw^orthiness of memory, and we all know
how little reliance can be placed here. Fourth, there is the belief in
the existence of other selves which are, by and large, like ourselves,
also fundamental but incapable of proof. Fifth, there are such self-
evident analytical judgments as one foot equals twelve inches, axioms
agreed upon by definition but having nothing whatever to do with the
events of nature or with what ordinary people regard as reality.
Sixth, and last, there are synthetic propositions concerning the rela-
tions between universals—such as black is different from white.
Upon these factors the whole fabric of science rests.
As a result all science becomes a highly personal and subjective
affair. It used to be said that the social sciences were not truly scien-
tific because the investigator could not be objective; he himself
formed part of his object of study. This is now seen to be true of
the biological and physical sciences as well. It is true to such an
extent that in Science Progress for October 1932 Prof. G. B. Brown
produced two or three pages of delightful humor on the subject—for
the elect and initiated.
Herein he depicted such great scientists as Einstein, Sir J. J.
Thompson, Lord Rutherford, Sir Arthur Eddington, Dirac, and
Heisenberg as each building his own peculiar little structure of highly
personal physics. Some, like Schrodinger and de Broglie, were
represented as living in rows of huts. Einstein was described as
standing at the entrance to a cave and facing a cliff of solid rock,
a little undecided just what to do.
Then, \vhat is the opinion of such a man about reality? That
should be more important than almost anything else. I sought to
find out, and in his Herbert Spencer Lecture "On the Method of
Theoretical Physics," delivered at Oxford University June 10, 1933,
Einstein delivered himself of his opinion. The lecture started with
the thought just mentioned above, subjectivity in physical science.
For Einstein began by saying that a man's "view of the past and
present history of his subject is likely to be unduly influenced by
what he expects from the future and what he is trying to realize
today." Our own F'rof. P. W. Bridgman expressed a similar idea
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some years ago when he wrote that "the chances are, therefore, that
the relations between phenomena will be found by those who are
previously convinced that the relations exist."'
This idea that the beliefs of the physical scientist determine the
kind of science he develops is not new. In the last article of the late
Viscount Haldane published in this country, in 1928, he declared
that all science had been driven back upon mind as the only basis
upon which explanations were available. In discussing "Reality in
Physics" before the American Physical Society, late in 1931,
Dr. W. F. G. Sw^ann described reality as "the most alluring of
courtesans, for she makes herself what you would have her at the
moment."
In his address delivered as President of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science in 1934 Sir James H. Jeans said
that "in the old physics the perceiving mind was a spectator; in the
new it is an actor. Nature no longer forms a closed system detached
from the perceiving mind ; the perceiver and the perceived are inter-
acting parts of a single system." We may accept it as fundamental
in modern scientific thought that the mind determines the type of
reality the physical or other scientists claim to perceive.
Einstein, in the address we were following, continued that pure
logical thinking could give us no knowledge whatever of the world
of experience, conclusions reached by such processes being entirely
empty so far as reality is concerned. However, modern theoretical
physics consists of certain basic concepts, which are purely invented
fictions, related together logically by laws, from which certain con-
sequences are deduced logically. The experiences and observations
of the scientist must conform to these theoretically deduced conse-
quences, otherwise the system is faulty.
Reason supplies the structure of modern science and experience
produces the data. Science dififers from a geometry like Euclid's
in that Euclid made no direct attempt to relate the consequences of
his logical theory to the experiences of reality. Hence, in modern
science, a fact is worth nothing until it is sustained by a good theory,
but the whole structure is, Einstein says, founded on "certain basic
concepts and laws which are not logically further deducible." These
indispensable concepts are merely assumed "true" as were the axioms
in our school geometries.
Therefore, unproven assumptions underlie all science and the
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character of any science depends largely upon the character of the
assumptions regarded as true in the first place. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth century, however, scientists did not realize the purely
fictitious character of their basic principles. Xewton, for instance,
believed that he developed his basic principles about space, time,
mass, force, acceleration, etc. directly from experience.
^M^ile Xewton was rendered a bit uneasy by his idea of abso-
lute space ( because it involved the idea of absolute rest and he
could find no body at absolute rest) he did not suppose his basic
concepts to be "free inventions of the human mind," as Einstein
puts it. Einstein and his coworkers, however, accepted the idea that
the basic postulates were freely invented and declared that "the fic-
titious character of the principles is made quite obvious by the fact
that it is possible to exhibit two essentially dift'erent bases, each of
which in its consequences leads to a large measure of agreement
with experience."
It is well, of course, for science to diminish the number and
increase the simplicity of its basic concepts, but there is then an
ever-wadening gap between the axioms and the consequences. The
widening of that gap worries modern physicists a great deal, Ein-
stein admits. Then, he asks, has a scientist any reason to hope that
they will find what he calls "the correct way" in time. His answer
to his own question is
:
"To this I answer with complete assurance that in my opinion
there is the (his own italics) correct path and, moreover, that it
is in our power to find it. Our experience up to date justifies us in
feeling sure that in Nature is actualized the ideal of mathematical
simplicity. It is my conviction that pure mathematical construction
enabled us to discover the concepts and laws connecting them which
give us the key to the understanding of the phenomena of Nature.''
That is all. A\'e may achieve understanding, but never direct
knowledge of some one absolute reality. Experience must still guide
us in the choice of the mathematical concepts to be used, though it
must not be the source of their derivation. "The truly creative prin-
ciple resides in mathematics."' ^vloreover Einstein is a strong be-
liever in simplicity in Nature, a belief which, we must remember,
determines the character of the science he will evolve and espouse.
He demands that science at all times search "for the mathematically
simplest concepts and connexions of them" and in the very paucity of
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the possible concepts and relations he sees "justification for the
theorist's hope that he may comprehend reality in its depths."
A'one the less the reality so comprehended and expressed in for-
midable equations would dififer enormously from what the average
person regards as reality. The detailed picture of space and time
made familiar to us by the older physicists would vanish utterly.
Instead we should have a group of impressive mathematical formulae
which can not be pictured. These new concepts can not be reduced
to the old terms nor visualized by use of the old pictures of reality.
The theory that mathematics will ultimately explain the uni-
verse is a metaphysical theory, of course, though it is the very heart
of modern scientific explanations. Ultimate reality and causal ef-
ficacy are ascribed to mathematics, and this world is then identified
as best it may be with the realm of material bodies moving in what
we naively call space and time. This Einsteinian world is not one
of stuffs or substances possessing certain qualities experienced by
human beings. It is a world of purely mathematical electrons which
move in accord with fixed mathematical laws. Is this reality?
Here is an ethereal stratosphere of four-dimensional continuums,
Riemannian metrics, vector-fields, anti-symmetrical tensor-vector-
fields, and spinor field quantities. All of this is very remote
from our daily life. Even quite expert scientists may become some-
what awed by this hypnotic nomenclature. Yet the results obtained
mathematically depend for their validity upon the number and quan-
tity of the data available, or upon the number of observations that
happen to have been made at the time the predicting calculations
were carried on.
For instance, both Neptune and the trans-Xeptunian planet were
found as predicted simply because the limited number of inaccurate
observations used by Leverrier and Lowell in their calculations hap-
pened by the merest chance to give a result that was later verified.
Had either prophet had more reliable data, or had the observations
existed in greater number, their predictions would have been com-
pletely falsified. So it is through all mathematics.
When a scientist weighs a crucible on his balance, takes a reading
on a colorimeter or polariscope, measures electric current by ob-
serving a pointer—and practically all science consists merely in ob-
serving pointer readings—he must finally arrive at a figure he calls
"correct." That is the average of a series of five, ten. or twenty
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weighings or readings. It very often is not precisely the same tigurc
as that for any one real weighing or reading, yet this purely mathe-
matical average is announced as the correct value.
Then what is the reality the scientist discovers? It depends not
only upon his original choice of basic concepts and his personal be-
liefs, hut also upon the quantity of data at hand. It is manifestly
certain that a chemist will not get exactly the same value when he
weighs a crucible five times and averages these weighings as when
he weighs it twenty-tive times and averages those weighings. It is
just as obvious that a rather unusually erroneous weighing will bulk
more heavily in the first average than in the second.
Hence mathematics is treacherous. It can not give us the inner
nature of real reality. It gives us a sort of austere mathematical
reality—a reality of averages, equations, and abstract concepts. This
is. however, the present chosen reality of modern physics and of
physical science generally. It fixes the pattern of science and. as
we saw earlier, that pattern determines the facts science will accept,
just as it is determined by the facts science has accepted.
F^or instance, it happens to be true that every major observation
of the speed of light that has been made since 1902 has given a
slightly smaller result than the previous observation. It would seem
logical to conclude, therefore, that the speed of light in miles per
second is really diminishing, but the scientists conclude no such thing.
The pattern of modern physics demands that the speed of light re-
main absolutely fixed, hence irregularities are attributed to "experi-
mental error."
Charles Peirce, noted American scientist and philosopher, went
so far as to suggest accepting the actual results in the case of any
scientific experiment, rather than having resort to averages. He was
bothered by the scientist's pet alibi, "experimental error," and said
why not assume that the individual results are correct and that all
scientific findings forever oscillate around purely theoretical and
fictioned fixed points? His heretical suggestion has been largely
ignored by science.
Consequently science continues to accept as "real" that which
its current pattern regards as real, no more no less. The chemist
accepts as the result of his analysis the average of twenty weighings
on his refined balance, not the result—the actual, true, real, experi-
mental result, that is—of a single weighing. Physical reality is re-
124 THE OPEN COURT
cluced to a set of equations, the electrons themselves have become
disembodied ghosts or near wave forms in four-dimensional space-
time, and statistical averages rule dictatorially over all.
Speaking in Germany in the fall of 1934 Prof. W. Heisenberg,
noted physicist and discoverer of the so-called principle of indeter-
minacy, remarked that the old physics which dealt with the behavior
of real entities in space and their real variations with time was no
more. The old view that "the occurrence of events in time and space
is independent of observation"' is gone forever. The concepts of
absolute time and of determinacy have no place in the new cosmic
physics, however useful they still are in certain limited fields such as
mechanics, optics, or thermo-dynamics, where they remain as un-
altered as did the geography of the Mediterranean Basin after the
voyages of Columbus and Magellan.
Heinsenberg very plainly said: "Thus Nature influences modern
natural science more than the earlier form in such a way as to place
the old c[uestion of realization of reality upon a new basis and to
answer it in a new manner. Previously the pattern of exact science
led to a philosophical system in which a definite truth
—
perhaps the
'Cogito, ergo sum,' of Descartes—was the starting point from which
all problems of world-view were to be attacked. Nature in modern
physics has reminded us clearly, however, that we may not hope to
reach the entire region of the understandable from such a fixed
basis of operation."
If any science should give us what we formerly regarded as
reality it should be physics. But what have we found? Physics is a
system of symbolic constritction. It starts with definite facts that
can be perceived but which are too gross for its immediate accept-
ance. Its pattern will not admit these crude data. So it proceeds
next to work in a highly theoretical field where many things are
imperceptible and where there is great freedom from the restraints
of experience. Thereafter it returns to the facts of nature to check
up.
A physicist sees, for instance, the deflections of a pointer on an
ammeter and notes that these change in certain ways when he adds
more wire to the electrical circuit. He then retires to his chamber
of speculations and invents entities he has never observed in order
to explain these facts, i.e., to make them intelligible to him in terms
of his thought pattern, for he believes he has perceived similar things
in similar but really quite different connections.
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He calls these invented entities "electric current," "resistance,"
"electromotive force," though he admits their properties are merely
assumed by definition, and they are useful merely because of their
symbolic character, and of the relations into which they can enter.
He derives a law, such as Ohm's Law, which no real electric current
ever does follow exactly. He deduces certain consecjuences that
should occur if this law were approximately true, then he returns
to the world of experience to see what he can see.
If the law is not verified it is false, though if it is verified that
does not prove it true—it proves merely that it held true in the par-
ticular tests made. In making these tests, the physicist says he is
measuring current, resistance, and electromotive force. He makes
his fiction of the electric current still more definite by imagining
streams of fictioned particles going through wires like molecules of
water down between river banks, and he calls these particles elec-
trons.
He next thinks of these particles as being charged with electricity
and, finally, of producing eitects (like cloud tracks) which can be
detected by the eye. Yet the electrons are never objects of percep-
tion. They are not part of nature, though by using such concepts the
physicist can make correct statements about matters of fact that
can be perceived in nature. The whole field of symbolic construction
of physics is thus filled wath masses, forces, electrons, and so forth,
but the reality we are searching does not appear.
It never does appear anywhere in science where materialism is
outmoded. For science and what the average person regards as
reality have parted company, and it looks as if the divorce were
absolute and final.
